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Abstract
We propose an approach to the question of how qualia fit into the physical world,
in the context of a relational and realist completion of quantum theory, called the
causal theory of views[27]. This is a combination of an approach to a dynamics of
discrete causal structures, called energetic causal sets[52]-[57], developed with M.
Cortes, with a realist approach to quantum foundations, called the real ensemble
formulation[49, 50].
In this theory, the beables are the information available at each event from its
causal past, such as its causal predessesors and the energy and momentum they trans-
fer to the event. We call this the view of an event. That is, we describe a causal uni-
verse that is composed of a set of partial views of itself.
We propose that conscious perceptions are aspects of some views. This addresses
the problem of why consciousness always involves awareness of a bundled grouping
of qualia that define a momentary self.
This gives a restricted form of panpsychism defined by a physically based selection
principle which selects which views have experiential aspects.
We further propose that only those views which are novel, in the sense that they
are not duplicates of the view of any event in the event’s own causal past, are the
physical correlates of conscious experience.
∗lsmolin@perimeterinstitute.ca
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1 Introduction
This paper addresses the mind-body problem. More specifically, what Chalmers has
called “The Hard Problem” of consciousness[1]. The problem is why conscious percep-
tions, such as the experiences of the colours red or blue, are associated with particular
physical processes-namely excitations of neurons in the cerebral cortex-whose complete
description in terms of the laws of physics does not and indeed cannot reference these
subjective aspects of experience. The languages the neurosciences give us so far, such as
synaptic potentials, electric currents, neurotransmitters, etc. explain a lot about how neu-
rons work, but do not seem to have the capability of either describing or explaining, why
or how these relate to the subjective mental experiences we all perceive.
The point has been put several different ways, from Leibniz’s mill[2], to Jackson’s
knowledge argument[3], featuring Mary the colour-blind neuroscientist to Chalmer’s
zombie argument[1]
Leibniz, in his Monadology, put the point as well as any,
It must be confessed, moreover, that perception, and that which depends on it, are
inexplicable by mechanical causes, that is, by figures and motions, And, supposing
that there were a mechanism so constructed as to think, feel and have perception, we
might enter it as into a mill. And this granted, we should only find on visiting it,
pieces which push one against another, but never anything by which to explain a
perception. This must be sought, therefore, in the simple substance, and not in the
composite or in the machine.
But I should hasten to add that while I address the “hard problem,” I do not solve
it. What I aim to do is to solve the “next hardest problem”, which is 1) to identify those
physical processes, events or states that are “associated with” or “correspond to” instances
of conscious perception (we will call these PCC for physical correlates of consciousness),
and 2) explain some of the characteristic features of conscious perception, to be described
below, in terms of the features or structure of these correlates of consciousness. While I do
not solve this either, I have some specific proposals and hypotheses to make concerning
the physical correlates of consciousness.
These proposals situate the search for an approach to the mind-body problem within
the search for what I call a completion of quantum mechanics. This is what is sometimes
called a non-local hidden variables theory: it is a realist description of precisely what goes
on in each individual event or process, which reduces to quantum mechanics in a certain
limit and averaging procedure. For reasons I described elsewhere[30, 22, 21], I confine the
search to completions of quantum mechanics which are relational, so that they address
also issues in quantum gravity.
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1.1 Brief summary of the proposals made here
In this paper I look to find the correlates of consciousness within the framework of a
recently proposed completion of quantum theory, called the causal theory of views[27].
This incorporates elements of two other frameworks, the real ensemble formulation of
QM[49, 50, 27], and the energetic causal set framework, which we developed with Ma-
rina Cortes[52]-[57]. I also look to another proposed completion of quantum mechanics,
called the principle of precedents[28], and find there another suggestion for the PCC.
To anticipate in the simplest possible terms, the key ideas are first, that the universe is
constructed from nothing but a collection of views of events, where the view of an event
is what can be known about that event’s place in the universe from what can be seen
from that event[27]. In other words, the beables of this theory are views from events,
comprised of the energy, momentum and other conserved charges that combine to create
the event, from its causal predecessors. Within such an ontology of views, it seems natural
to propose that instances or moments of conscious experience are aspects of some views.
That is, an elementary unit of consciousness is not a single qualia, but the entire of a
partial view of the universe, as seen from one event.
The second proposal restricts the views that are associated with consciousness to
within a very small set. Most events and their views are common, in that they have many
near copies in the universe. Most events could also be called routine, in that nearly iden-
tical views appear numerous times within their causal pasts. I then propose that these
common and routine views have no conscious perceptions. Then, there are a few, very
rare views which are unprecedented, which are having their first instance, or are unique,
in that they have no copies in the universe. I propose it is those few views of events,
which are unprecedented, and/or unique, and are hence novel, which are the physical
correlates of conscious perceptions.
Elsewhere[30][60]-[65] I have argued in detail for the view that quantum mechanics is
incomplete, in that it does not give a full description of, nor explanation for, all individ-
ual physical processes, independent of our knowledge, or interventions. This implies the
need for a “realist” completion of quantum mechanics. I will not repeat these arguments
here. Of course, a completion is also required for unifying gravity, spacetime and cosmol-
ogy into the rest of physics. The causal theory of views is intended to be a completion in
both senses.
The causal theory of views is the present stage of a research program I have been
carrying out since the 1980’s to construct such a realist double completion of quantum
mechanics and general relativity[60]-[65]. The common theme, motivating all these at-
tempts, has been that of a relational hidden variables theory [60]-[65]. This situates it within
the relational tradition developed by Leibniz, Mach, Einstein, and others, according to
which physical degrees of freedom describe dynamically evolving relationships amongst
particles, fields or other dynamical actors, rather than being defined against a fixed, non-
dynamical background structure such as absolute space. My aim has been that this would
be the case also for the additional “hidden variables” needed to complete the quantum
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dynamics[60].
I simultaneously developed the idea that the relational variables which completed
quantum mechanics would also underlie a discrete formulation of spacetime, so that the
full theory would be a completion of both quantum mechanics and general relativity, ie
it would also be the quantum theory of gravity. So, I like to think that it is no coincidence
that the basic tools for describing a system of relations, namely, networks, and matrices,
occur in all background independent formulations of quantum gravity [20]-[26] as well as
in the various relational hidden variable theories I and others introduced[60]-[65],[67, 68].
All of these developments, beginning with several formulations of relational hidden
variables theories[60]-[65], and developing into the real ensemble formulation[49, 50, 27],
the principle of precedence[28] and the causal theory of views[27] are each described in
detail in previous publications[30]. The causal theory of views, is also a development of
a class of models of causal spacetime, called Energetic Causal Sets, developed in a series
of papers with Marina Cortes[52]-[57].
To summarize briefly this already brief summary, taking the relational philosophy
seriously-in a way that lets us read the Principle of the Identity of the Indiscernible as a
dynamical principle (see below)- makes possible two concepts on which to base a theory:
First is the proposal of taking the beables of a relational theory to be the views of events.
Second is the possibility of making a physical distinction between common and routine
states, on the one hand, and novel and unique states, on the other. The whole point of this
paper is that a relational theory that incorporates both ideas offers a possible setting for
bringing qualia and consciousness into physics. The physical correlates of consciousness
are the novel or unique views of events.
The proposals I describe here are made within the language and frameworks of the
specific theories, just mentioned. This does not rule out the possibility of implementing
them in the context of another approach to quantum foundations. But at present I only
know how to express them within these, closely related frameworks.
1.2 Some comments on the mind-body problem
Before getting to my specific proposals, I make some general comments on the mind body
problem.
First of all, I take the existence of our conscious perceptions such as colours and
tones-which are often called qualia, to be a fact about the natural world[6], to be natu-
rally incorporated into, and even explained by, any fully complete theory of the natural
world[6, 4, 5]. Further, I take various features and characteristics of our experience (to be
discussed below) as phenomena to be explained by the theory.
I should hasten to add that the suggestions I make here are all within the paradigm of
naturalism, so that I assume that qualia and other aspects of our conscious experiences
are aspects of the natural world, alongside energy and charge. Here I follow a number of
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philosophers1, including William James[10], Russell[11], Eddington[12], Strawson[6] and
Goff[4, 5].
I would also consider these suggestions to be within the constraints of physicalism,
if by that we mean the assumption that all our understanding of the natural world is
eventually to be grounded in (which is to say, possibly emergent from) the final, correct
complete theory 2 of physics[4].
My thinking on these questions was to a large extent inspired by the panpsychists,
or Russellian neutral monists, whose proposal that qualia are universal aspects of the
intrinsic or fundamental nature of matter, seemed to me, for a long time, to be the most
plausible view[13]. The neat trick of making qualia causally null, by making them “inner
aspects” of all physical processes, and so not conflict with the causal completeness of the
standard laws of physics, in spite of being real, seemed to me too perfect a solution to the
body-mind problem not to take seriously3.
But when you take it seriously, it raises a number of puzzles which seem hard to ad-
dress, given the assumptions made. Among them, if all physical processes have intrinsic
aspects which are qualia, what distinguishes those bundles of qualia we experience from
the qualia associated to the myriads of processes that unconsciously fill our heads? Fol-
lowing this are a number of questions about the particular ways our conscious experience
appears to be structured which seem hard to address, given the claimed universality of
the merging of physical and experienced aspects of nature.
The monist step of seeing qualia as aspects of physical processes seems promising. It
is the assumption that the correspondence is universal that seems to land us in trouble.
The question I want to raise in this paper is then whether we might find a more ex-
planatory theory if we keep the monist-dual aspect ontology, but restrict the association
of qualia and consciousness to a restricted subset of physical processes, events or states,
where the restriction was based on purely physical properties? The proposals I make here
are intended as first steps in this direction.
The view I propose here might be called a kind of restricted panpsychism. It departs
from the usual formulation of panpsychism on several points.
It does not propose that qualia are associated with all material states or processes.
Instead, I propose that there are specific, generally rare, aspects or features of certain
physical processes, which allows them to be correlates of consciousness.
We are thus challenged to discover a selection principle which is a physically based crite-
ria which distinguishes the small minority of events, or states, or processes, to which cor-
respond conscious perceptions. These will be physical correlates of consciousness. (PCC).
This strategy is not new; a prior example is integrated information theory, which pro-
1A very clear introduction to the philosophy of “neutral monism” espoused by these philosophers is in
the book of Rodolfo Gambini[9]
2Note that I say theory here, rather than laws, because I believe that the laws must be restricted to sub-
systems and evolve on cosmological scales[31]-[33].Indeed will suggest below that the physical correlates
of consciousness may be related to the evolvability of the laws.
3For a good discussion, see [14].
6
poses a certain physical quantity, the integrated information, as a measure of, or selection
principle for, consciousness[43, 44]4.
Note here something important: Neuroscientists look for neural correlates of consciousness[34]-
[37]. (NCC) and our program will gain a lot by their success. But, we should expect that
neural correlates of consciousness should be such because they are composed partly of
physical processes which are physical correlates of consciousness!
Among the things we would like to explain are structural questions about conscious-
ness, some of which are the following:
1. The “scene” or ”bundling” problem: Why are qualia never perceived singly, but
only bundled together with others into a frame or scene?
2. The “viewpoint” or “self” problem: Why is our conscious experience shaped in
ways that appear to depend on our prior beliefs and intensions? i.e. why does our
consciousness seem to reflect a point of view of the world around us, more an active
probe than passive recipient of “raw sensations.”
3. The “presentism” problem: Why does that scene bundled together represent, ap-
proximately to be sure, a thickened (ie of some small duration) moment of time.
4. The “unique self” problem: Why does there seem to be only a single unique framed
or bundled scene for every human brain, at each time? Why not many? This is
especially puzzling given that the brain is simultaneously running a great many
parallel processes, most of which we are unaware.
5. The structural mismatch problem[18]: Goff makes the point clearly[4] p 203:
“On the face of it, the structure of the brain seems radically unlike the struc-
ture of the .... conscious mind, as revealed through introspection. But if the mind
and the brain are identical, or at least grounded in the same micro level base, one
might expect them to have the same structure”
Or, as Edelman and Tononi emphasize, the majority of neural processing in the brain
is never experienced or perceived[34]. It is the job of a physical theory to explain
why some are and most aren’t, not just by describing the NCC, but by explaining
on the basis of a physical selection principle why the NCC are, such, because they
incorporate the PCC.
6. The modality problem:5 Why are different modalities, such as sight, sound, pain,
smell, etc. experienced as qualitatively quite different, in spite of their correspond-
ing NCC being quite similar?
4It is intriguing that both the integrated information and the notion of variety, introduced with Julian
Barbour in[51], which plays a crucial role in what follows, are measures of complexity.
5Also called the “Palette problem[4] pps 193-202”
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7. The “linear scale” problem: Why do several of the modalities, while qualitatively
distinct, distinguish within themselves by a linear scale? Why is this true of some
modalities (vision and hearing), while not true of others (olfaction, touch)?
Panpsychists are exploring ways to address these questions, this has led to a large
literature, mostly in philosophy of mind, that I am not sufficiently a scholar of to sum-
marize6. But it does seem to me that the obstacles are challenging. Because they must
assume that all physical processes are PCC, they have a hard time explaining why all
neuronal processes are not experienced, or why the tiny fraction that are experienced, are
those that are structured as they are.
That is–and this seems to me an important fact–there is nothing easier than imaging
instances of conscious experience which are never experienced by us, to start with expe-
riences of pure colour or sound, or experiences of higher level organizations like species
or families. Pan-psychism starts with a disadvantage, because they are committed to be-
lieving all forms and organizations of matter have or manifest internal aspects which are
instances of consciousness. There is, if they are right, a universe of experience that they
must explain how and why is disconnected from ours.
Any proposal for such a selection principle is bound at this point to be highly spec-
ulative and the ones that follows are no exception7. However, even if, as is likely at the
present state of knowledge, any particular proposal for the selection principle or PCC
turns out to be wrong, I would suggest that the search for them is likely eventually to
lead to success.
It seems to me unlikely that qualia can be grounded in the classical, ie non-quantum
side of physics. For one thing, I don’t see that they have anything to offer for a selection
principle for addressing the structural questions just mentioned. Consider the structural
mismatch problem, applied to proposals for a PCC. If our conscious experience is not
structured anything like the brain, it is even less structured like a classical physical sys-
tem. We know how to reduce the description of a metal to the physics of its atoms, but as
we have remarked (the self problem) conscious experience has no atoms of experience it
can be reduced to.
But as pointed out by several authors, most recently by Chalmers and McQueen [47]
and Gambini and Pullin[48], the ontology of quantum states does seem to be structured
in some aspects like a conscious experience. Due to the entanglement, or non-separability
of quantum states, such states have properties attributable only to the entire of a compos-
ite system, which are not reducible to properties of the parts. The way in which single
colours, motions and sounds are woven together into a single framed conscious moment,
seems to have an at least partly similar character. It has also been pointed out that both
6A good introduction is the recent book [4].
7One that comes to mind as a partial, if not yet successful, precedent for what I am about to propose is
the Penrose-Hammeroff proposal[39], that consciousness has something to do with dynamical collapses of
the wavefunction in a theory where that has become a physical process, where those events are taking place
within microtubules of neurons in the brain. But see also [40] for criticism of specifics of this proposal.
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conscious states and quantum states seem vulnerable to an instability of observation, in
that measuring or observing them necessarily changes them.
On the other hand, if conscious states may seem in some aspects like non-separable
or entangled states, we seem never to experience a conscious state which is a superpo-
sitions of two or more conscious states. It seems true that in all the conscious states we
experience, everything which is part of our view has a definite value. This has led to a
long tradition according to which consciousness is proposed to be responsible for, or in
some way associated with collapse of the wave-function, so that we always experience
the results of our observations to be single, definite values[45, 46, 47, 48].
Indeed, Penrose and Hammeroff[39], Chalmers and McQueen[47], Gambini and Pullin[48],
and others have already put forward proposals for how consciousness may play a role in
the domain of possible completions of quantum phenomena. The proposals I make here
are similar.
2 The context: relational physics
The relational tradition, which motivates the theories within which my proposals con-
cerning PCC are made, is based on a few simple ideas. To put what follows in context, I
state the main ideas in this short section.
2.1 Basic principles of relational physics
The following are all different ways to state the idea of relationalism[15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 22].
• The principle of the identity of indiscernible (PII) asserts that two individuals (events)
with exactly the same view of the rest of the universe are to be identified[15, 16].
What is particular about the following is that I aim to achieve this dynamically,
through a term in the action that seeks to maximize a measure of the diversity of
views[50, 27], which we call the variety[51]. As a consequence, the ocurance of a
pair of events with identical views is forbidden energetically.
Thus, one can say this theory is one that takes the PII seriously, and that this makes
possible the proposals concerning consciousness I make here.
A consequence is the following:
• Individuals are identified uniquely through their relations: Individuals, whether events,
particles, or subsystems, don’t have intrinsic names or labels or coordinates. They
are distinguished and named only by what they know about the rest of the system
through their interactions or shared relationships, ie by what they see when they
look around This is expressed as the view of that individual[15, 16].
So we never think of an individual particle as placed or moving in a background
space. We think of an individual only in terms of its view of the rest.
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• Background independence[20]: Most theories have non-dynamical fixed elements with
respect to which the dynamical variables are defined. We call these the background,
because it usually refers to a part of the universe that is not being modelled that is
used as a fixed reference point against which to measure changes in the dynamical
variables we are modeling. An example is Newton’s absolute space, which Mach
understood is a stand in for the “fixed stars,” i.e the rest of the universe. A theory
that has a chance to make a complete description of nature must hence be back-
ground independent; and depend on no fixed background structure.
• No view of the whole universe as if from outside of it[71, 59, 58]. We seek a theory that
could be applied to the universe as a whole. Most theories we work with, including
quantum mechanics, Newtonian mechanics, special relativistic field theory, cannot
be extended to the entire universe because they rely on fixed background structure
created by splitting the universe into two parts, one of which serves as the fixed,
non-dynamical reference. By this slogan we remind ourselves that a theory of a
whole universe–a cosmological theory– must be structurally very different from the
theories we use.
One structure that is common to theories suited for subsystems of the universe is a
fixed, timeless configuration or phase space, on which acts an Hamiltonian which
generates ahead of time all the possible lawful histories. We call theories like this
the Newtonian paradigm[59, 58]. The ability to determine all the possible configu-
rations ahead of the evolution of the system corresponds to the existence of a clean
separation between the effects of laws and of initial conditions. This requires that
we are studying a class of subsystems of the universe, so we can operationalize
the split in the functions of laws and initial conditions, by repeating an experiment
many times, with different initial conditions.
Systems outside the Newtonian paradigm include those that, by their intrinsic com-
plexity, make it impossible to work out the set of possible configurations ahead of
letting the system evolve dynamically. Because there is only one universe, cosmo-
logical theories are cases where one cannot make a clean separation of the effects
of laws and initial conditions; this is one of several reasons they fall outside the
Newtonian paradigm.
So the slogan here is one universe, described by many partial views.
• No causes from outside the universe. Similarly all chains of causation must stay within
the universe.
• No global symmetries, hence no global conservation laws.
A symmetry is a way to move the subsystem whose dynamics you are modelling
relative to the fixed background without costing energy. Because of locality, the
dynamical system can be assumed to be weakly coupled to the background-whose
own dynamics can then be neglected.
10
Gauge invariances, such as diffeomorphism invariance in general relativity, are an-
other story, they are a strategy to expunge non-dynamical backgrounds and trans-
form a background dependent theory into a more relational, background indepen-
dent theory.
• There are two very different notions of time within relational theories, giving rise to
two different versions of relationalism, and hence, two versions of naturalism[21].
Some hold that time is not fundamental, but can be eliminated in favor of timeless
law, this is called timeless naturalism. On this view there is no objective distinc-
tion between past, present and future; these are just differences of perspective. One
version of timeless naturalism is the block universe of general relativity. Opposed
to this is the temporal version of naturalism[21, 22, 59, 58], that embraces an objec-
tive distinction between past and the future, separated by an ever moving present
moment. In these ontologies time is fundamental and irreversible, space is often
emergent and laws evolve8.
Temporal naturalism is similar to presentism, but they are not the same thing.
It has been noted before that if one takes a realist attitude towards qualia and con-
scious experience one is pushed towards embracing time and the present moment
as real. One way to say why is that there are two aspects of nature that are not cap-
turable in a purported identification of the history of the universe with a timeless9
mathematical object. One is the present moment, the other is a conscious sensation.
And indeed they seem related because every sensation is contained in a present
moment.
2.2 How to describe a cosmological theory? The general picture and
vocabulary
So how are we to go about constructing a cosmological theory within a relational frame-
work?
The key thing we learned from the previous subsection is that if the completion we
seek of quantum mechanics is to be at least the double completion including the require-
ment that it make sense as a theory of cosmology, it has several important features not
shared by theories of subsystems. These will all be useful for identifying the PCC.
In a completely relational theory, a universe with no fixed background can be de-
scribed as an inter-nested complex of dynamical subsystems, each one of which can be
thought of as being described in terms of its interactions with the rest. We talk about this
in terms of the view a subsystem has of its surroundings, by which we mean the infor-
mation available to it of those other subsystems it interacts with most strongly. We call
8Very briefly, because timeless laws can be used to express variables at any time as functions of initial
conditions, and hence eliminate time from the description of nature[59, 58].
9Timeless because temporal causation is modeled by logical inference.
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them the subsystem’s neighbours, by virtue of its interaction with them. The view of a
subsystem, I , will be denoted VI .
In different theories in this class, the views of the subsystems will have diverse mathe-
matical descriptions. This may be given by labeled graphs, or by vectors in a vector space,
or even the space of functions of a certain kind on a sphere. There is in each case, a set or
space of possible views, S.
In a background independent theory, the notions of space, position, relative distance
in space are no longer fundamental, We posit that space is not present at the fundamental
level of description, but is emergent, together with the relative positions of the various
subsystems.
In this world a fundamental role is played, not by distances or coordinates in a back-
ground space, but by differences between pairs of views10. As a result, the principle of
locality-that you interact most strongly and directly with that which is closest to you (in
a background space) is replaced by a principle of similarity, according to which you in-
teract with those whose views of the universe are most similar to yours. Note that this
interaction will need to be repulsive to satisfy the PII as well as maximize diversity of
views.
In many situations, locality will track similarity of views, because you and your neigh-
bour will have similar views of the surroundings. This is especially likely for the views
of massively composite systems, which we expect to be both complex and unique. This
will be the basis for the recovery of standard physics. An example we find in the CTV is
the emergence from an energetic causal set of a Minkowski spacetime, together with an
embedding of the network of events and causes in it[27].
But not always: sometimes similarity of views will conflict with emergent notions
of spatial distance. This is likely to be the case for views of microscopic or funamental
events, as their views will have few degrees of freedom, and hence, in a large universe
will have many accidental near copies. This, we show in the real ensemble theory and the
CTV, is the origin of quantum phenomena, including nonlocal entanglement[49, 50, 27].
To study these ideas concretely we will need to formulate a space of views, S, on
which we will need to define a measure of difference of two views, I and J , ie a distance
function on S, which we will call D(I, J)[52, 27].
In the absence of any notion of space, how do we define dynamics? We propose in
[52, 50, 27] that the dynamics of a closed, relational system is to be expressed in terms of
differences between views of its subsystems.
The other big idea is that the most important relationship involved in physical sys-
tems is causation: event E is the partial cause of event F[23, 71, 24, 52]. Indeed, nine of
the ten functions that define the metric of spacetime go to describing the causal structure,
that is which events were causally prior to which events. If we know the causal rela-
tions amongst events we have a very physical definition of a neighbourhood: a causal
neighbourhood .of event E consists of those events causally prior to E.
10For a fully worked out model exhibitiing these principles, please see [52]-[57].
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Rafael Sorkin and collaborators have been studying models of discrete analogues of
spacetimes where the only property an event may have is who is in its causal past[23].
These are called causal set models. Cortes and I made their structures slightly more com-
plicated by giving the events and causal relations quantities of energy and momentum, as
internal or intrinsic quantities; we call these energetic causal sets[52]-[57]. The causal the-
ory of views[27] joins this with the real ensemble framework for quantum realism[49, 50].
3 Hypotheses about physical correlates of consciousness
(PCC)
There is a great deal more to say to explain the motivation for the theories I will now
discuss. However, as these are available in various books[58, 59, 30] and papers (cited
above) I want to jump right in and describe in as simple language as possible the basic
ideas as well as how these may work to generate hypotheses as to the physical correlates
of consciousness.
3.1 The causal theory of views[27]
This approach is based on the application of the real ensemble formulation[49, 50] to
a class of models of discrete or quantum spacetime we developed with Marina Cortes,
called energetic causal sets (ECS)[52]-[57].
We begin with the latter
3.1.1 The basics of energetic causal sets [52]-[57].
We work within an ontology of events according to which the history of the universe
is composed of events, connected by causal relations. We also hypothesize that energy
and momentum are fundamental, and are transmitted from parent to child events, by
the causal processes that create new events from present events, in such a way as to con-
serve them. Thus, while there is no space, and no spacetime fundamentally, there is a
momentum space, whose geometry dictates how energy-momentum vectors are to be
combined[69, 70].
Space is not part of the fundamental description, the events do not live in a space or
a spacetime. At a later stage, a spacetime may emerge as a consequence of solving the
equations of motion that guide the transmission of energy and momentum through the
dynamically generated causal structure[52, 53].
The fundamental causal processes, ie the activity of time, is the continual creation of
new events, by means of the selection of their parent events, from a reservour of present
events. At each step in the construction, parents events are chosen and an event is added,
together with its causal connections to its parent events, following a rule which is part
of the definition of the model. The details are in [52, 53], but the important thing to say
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is that the rule aims to increase the diversity of the views of the present events. This
event creation process creates a discrete partial order, or causal structure. Each event has
a specified number of parents, Np and can have at most Nc children.
After each step, the set of events can be divided into present and past events. A past
event has had its limit, Nc, of children and can no longer directly influence the future,
through the creation of new events. So the particular history of the system defines, at
each step in the event creation process, a physically defined, thick present, which are
those events which have after their creation, not yet been parents to Nc events. By thick
we mean that two present events may nonetheless be causally related.
The future does not yet exist, and indeed may be undeteremined, for example if the
event creation rule has a stochastic element. This is important for what follows.
3.1.2 Connecting to the real ensemble formulation
In order to join this theory of events to the real ensemble formulation, which is a realist
formulation of quantum physicis, we need to specify what are the beables. What are the
beables of an event?
The beable of an event is defined as its momentary view of the rest of the universe, ie
it is the information available at that event of its near causal past (or past causal neigh-
bourhood) through the causal processes that created it. Hence the view of an event is a
snapshot of information about its ancestry, transmitted by its parent events. This includes
the set of immediate past causal links and the energy and momentum they carry.
No elementary event has only one cause. Therefor there are no isolated elements of
views, each view contains a number of elements unified by being part of the view of a
particular event.
At an elementary level, the view consists of a framing, which is a two-sphere, marked
with labeled points, each representing the incoming direction of each of its Np parental
causal processes (gotten from the direction of the incoming momentum), with the label
taken to be a measure of the energy transmitted by that causal process11. There is a space
of possible views, V of an event.
We can call this description of the view of an event its sky; it is literally what is seen
looking outward (and hence back into its causal past) from the event. The views are
sufficient to reconstruct the events and their causal relations as well as flows of energy-
momentum. So, while we started thinking of events and causal processes, we end up
with just the views, as the only beables.
Events may be combined into sets of events, which have a joint causal past, hence each
set of events also has a joint view. There is a natural algebra for combining views. This
remind us of surgery joining topological two surfaces. Some laws act together on sets of
events and their views, we call these law-bound. Entangled states and coherent states
will require this treatment.These must be dealt with irreducibly.
11Among the classical constraints satisfied is the energy-momentum relation.
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The event creation dynamics knows about the views only through their differences,
D(I, J). It is specified by requiring that the diversities of views is maximal.
In a “continuum limit” in which a spacetime emerges, together with an embedding
of the discrete causal structure into it, a view must become approximated by a cross-
section of a backwards light cone, (ie a sphere of some dimension) on which are found
punctures or (coarse grained) fields, which carry energy-momentum and other conserved
quantities[27]. In our universe, d = 2. Thus a view physically is a full or partial S2,
on which live, depending on the level of description, punctures labeled by energy, mo-
mentum and other conserved charges, or pull backs of fields (into the light cone’s cross-
section) carrying those conserved quantities.
The real ensemble theory is a realist completion of QM, which, in its most general formu-
lation, is based on the principle that the dynamical variables of the theory are differences
of views of subsystems. This can be thought of as a norm or distance function D(I, J).
On a theory with many subsystems, SI , each of which has a view of the others: vJI
represents the view of the subsystem J from the subsystem I . The subsystems may also
be composites and have internal degrees of freedom yαI , that also are seen in the views.
In this world a fundamental role is played, not by distances in a background space,
but by differences between pairs of views. We will then employ D(I, J) as a measure of
difference of two views, I and J , ie a distance function on a space of views, S.
The dynamics has two parts. There is the event generator, which picks the parents
of each newly create event. Then there is an action principle which determines how the
energy and momentum are distributed to the recently formed events. This is of the rough
form
S = K[∆D(I, J)]− U [D(I, J)] (1)
where the potential energy is a functional of difference between views and the kinetic en-
ergy, K is a functional of the rates of change of the differences between views, ∆D(I, J).
The kinetic energy comes from the energetic causal set models, while the potential en-
ergy is taken from the real ensemble models[50], and is chosen so that there is a strong
repulsive interaction when two views are very similar. A good choice is a measure of
complexity called the variety, V .
The variety, V of a system of relations is a useful measure of the diversity present in
the set of views[51, 50, 27], and is a function of the D(I, J)12.
V = 1
N2
∑
J<K
1
D(J,K) (2)
where N is the number of subsystems. The potential energy U will be proportional to the
negative of V
U = −αV (3)
12To eliminate coordinate dependent effects, which arise from fictional “outside observers”, the distance
functional, D(I, J)., is sometimes defined through a best matching procedure (see [73]).
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This has the consequence that the forces are strongest-and are repulsive-between two
views whose difference is small.
The constant α will turn out to be related to ~
m
.
We intend something like an ensemble interpretation of quantum mechanics, but rather
than being an interpretation of the usual formulas this is a construction of Schrodinger
quantum dynamics for a function of variables which describes a real ensemble, by which
I mean that, rather than being a mathematical description of an imaginary ensemble, each
and every member of this ensemble exists somewhere in the universe. That is, the wave-
function of a water molecule at the tip of my cat’s left whisker is built from information
about an ensemble of water molecules in similar conditions scattered through out the
universe.
This general framework is presented in [49, 50]. We are interested here in the applica-
tion to the energetic causal sets, which is the main subjects of [27]. Then the whole system
is an energetic causal set, constructed up to some step. The elementary subsystems are
the events, and we have already said that their views are extracted from the information
in their past causal neighbourhoods; these will generally be truncated a finite number of
causal links. Thus, we have a graded structure in which the p’th past causal neighbor-
hood of the event E, which we will also call the p′th view, is the past of E truncated p
steps into the causal past.
As we sketched above for the first view, the information in these views can be repre-
sented as a 2-sphere with labeled punctures.
At each step in the construction, there is a present set of events and their views.
For each event, we ask if there are other events in the present which are similar to it.
We make hte arbitrary distinction that a set of M events Eα {E) have views which are all
within some small number  of each other:
∀α, β D(Eα, Eβ) < , (4)
We note that these are, by the assumptions stated above, all strongly interacting with
each other. We hypothesize that the result is that the views of the members of the en-
semble may be changing their values often, but in a way that can be expressed by a static
probability function,
ρ(VI) (5)
Now let us consider two opposite cases, first a set of many similar events, so M >> 1.
The individual values are rapidly changing within a narrow range, due to the strong
interactions within the ensemble, but there can be an equilibrium, in which the probability
distribution is slowly changing, and becomes uniform on the ensemble. We are able to
show that the probability distribution represents the modulus of a wave-function that
satisfies the Shrodinger equation.
This quick summary leaves out many steps, to mention just one-we are able to extract
from the information in the views, phases, which are correlated with the energy in the
views and which become the phases of the wavefunction.
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Thus, events whose views have many near copies define ensembles of views, whose
evolution is, in a certain limit, defined to leading order (in 1/M ), described by the Schrodinger
equation.
But what of events whose views have no near copies? Most likely these will be com-
posite events of sufficient complexity and numbers of degrees of freedom that they would
be associated with a history made up by a mesoscopic or macroscopic process or system.
When a subsystem is too complex or large, it will not have any copies in the universe,
so it is not a part of such a large ensemble. Hence they do not correspond to pure quantum
states. These are the novel states. Their evolution law is not the Schroedinger equation,
but a more complex non-linear equation, governed by the full dynamics of the comple-
tion. The dynamics is specified by the same theory, but without taking the large M limit
or constructing an ensemble and its probability distribution.
Some first steps towards exploring this anti-quantum limit are taken in [49, 50]. To
leading order in the inverse of the number of copies, this can be expressed as a non-linear
extension of the Schrodinger equation, that conserves probability but is not unitary. This
then falls into a class of modifications of quantum mechanics that is very vulnerable to
experimental tests.
This is, we may note, a solution to the measurement problem, because macroscopic
devices, clocks, ourselves and our cats all are unique and have no copies, hence are not
described by a wavefunction.
More generally, we see that there are naturally three classes of views: views which
have many near copies, views which have a small number of near copies and views that
are unique. Thus, this completion of quantum mechanics is also an extension of quantum
physics. In the first class we find a derivation of ordinary quantum mechanics, in the
second, a new class of nonlinear quantum phenomena. The third, unique views, will
play a special role in the following.
3.1.3 From views to correlates of consciousness
We are now ready to state my first hypothesis about the physical correlates of conscious-
ness. This is related to what we will call the first observation regarding consciousness.
• First observation: There are no ”atoms of experience”, ie experiences of nothing but
a shade of red or blue or a pure high c. Each conscious perception comes as a complex
but irreducible unity, which may contain a number of qualia, thoughts, sounds, smells, all
together, defining a (thick)moment of time, always in a frame, which is often experienced as
a two-sphere, or a piece of one. We call this a framed conscious perception.
• First hypothesis: Each framed conscious perception corresponds to the view of a physical
event or law-bound sets of events.
The framing of a conscious perception is another way of stating the self problem:
there are no elementary qualia which are pure colors or pure tones. Each view is
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experienced as a whole, with colors or tones bound into a frame defined by the two-
sphere. That is it suggests there is something or someone whose bundled or framed
complex perception this is.
The first hypothesis answers the self-problem: it is the conscious perception corre-
lated to the view of a particular event or law-bound set of events. This addresses
how qualia are bound into a single frame.
The “presentist problem” is addressed because each framed conscious perception is
associated to a single event or, to a law-bound set of events. In the latter case, the
moment may be thick.
The uniqueness of the self-problem is not yet addressed13.
• We notice that the bundled qualia are each associated with beables, so there is no
ambiguity, as beables always have definite values. This explains the fact that we
experience a world in which all variables have definite values.
If we look ahead at how the theory we are sketching may, we hope, be a completion
of QM in two senses-that it resolves the foundational issues of quantum theory, and
that it gives a home to qualia and framed perceptions in a physical theory. These
two issues must relate, because we want the perceived (ie selected) events to arise
at the level where we experience beables, which take on definite values, not ob-
servables. We do not perceive superpositions, hence the events whose views are
perceived must be limited to those events where the superpositions are resolved.
These events must be rare, within a framework in which possible or potential his-
tories are summed over. This then underlies the hypothesis that the rare events
associated with conscious experience are expressions of the mechanism by which
the real beables are defined, in a completion of quantum mechanics.
3.2 Common and unique views
I have proposed that the PCC are views, and that this addresses the “self” or bundled
problem.
In the last section, we saw that the real ensemble formulation gives a special role to
unique views, which have no present near copies. We also saw that these are sometimes
the views of large or complex composite events. This makes it natural to propose the
following two hypotheses:
• Second hypothesis: Common events, which are those whose views have many near copies,
are those described to good approximation by quantum mechanics as formulated presently.
These are not correlates of conscious perceptions.
13To do that we need to be able to define a hierarchy of inclusions of events, which in turn dictates an
algebra of views. The problem may be solved if there is a property like entanglement, which can serve as a
selection principle, which will be present up to a top level. [See Markopoulou et al [71, 72].]
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• Third hypothesis: Only views of unique events or unique law-bound sets of events are cor-
relates of conscious perceptions.
3.3 The hierarchy problem
Nature is full of hierarchies of composite systems, which are quantum at several levels.
Furthermore they may be entangled at a succession of levels as well. A quark is part of
a quantum system, entangled with two other quarks, to make a proton. That proton is in
turn bounded and entangled with other protons, making a nucleus. The nucleus is bound
and entangled into an atom, which is entangled into a molecule, and so on.
In the real ensemble formulation, each of these is part of an ensemble. There is an
ensemble of nuclei, many- but not necessarily all, are member of ensembles of their own.
Ascending the hierarchy, there are ensembles connected with each level of the hierar-
chy of bound systems. There are then beables associated with each level.
More formally, in quantum mechanics there is a way to build composite systems out
of components, by taking the direct products of the Hilbert spaces representing the parts.
Depending on the formulation of quantum physics one subscribes to, this process never
stops till you get to the last composite which is the universe as a whole, or it stops at some
level at which the Hilbert space description is no longer relevant.
In the real ensemble formulation, the process alters as we go up the levels, and the
number of near copies in the ensembles fall rapidly, till it gets. to a level where the sub-
system is unique and has no near copies. Let us call this the top level. There will still
be a process of composing parts into wholes that continues for some number of levels,
but above the top level, these will be only composites of individuals, without their being
members of ensembles.
In the causal theory of views the real ensemble framework is applied to views. There
must then be ways to construct composites of views, which are themselves views. This
part of the theory is not yet fully worked out, but let us for a moment proceed as if it is,
assuming that at each level of a hierarchy of composites, there is an ensemble of nearly-
but not precisely-similar views. This then also stops at a top level, at which the view is
unique, so it is not a member of any ensemble of nearly similar views.
This affords us a final step in the selection principle for conscious perceptions:
• Fourth hypothesis: Only the top level of each hierarchy of ensembles of views are correlates
of conscious perceptions. These are the first levels in the hierarchy which are unique single
views, with no near copies.
4 Principle of precedence
I now want to introduce an alternative selection principle which also vastly reduced the
set of views that will be candidates for PCC. This is connected with the principle of prece-
dence I introduced in [28]. This leads to a similar second and third hypothesis.
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Let me begin with the idea that the laws of physics, or at least their dimensionless
parameters, must change and evolve, if they are to be explainable[31, 32]. I have made
the case for this at length in several books and papers[31, 32, 33, 58, 59, 21], here I will
simply work with the simplest proposal so far made for laws to evolve, which I called the
principle of precedence[28].
The principle of precedence is a mechanism by which the dynamics of a quantum
system (ie the unitary evolution operator, U ), could evolve in time. More specifically the
dynamical law is replaced by a principle of precedence, which I describe below[28].
But first I want to introduce some language to frame this and other proposals.
4.1 Routine and novel events
I propose we divide events and law-bound sets of events into routine events and novel
events.
Routine events are the vast bulk of events where the laws act as on those in the past,
so that no mechanism of law-change is acting.
Novel events are those that have no near14 precedents in their causal past.
Similarly, we can speak of routine states and novel states, a novel state is one that has
no precedents in its causal past, Those that have many precedents are routine.
I now make two alternative hypotheses:
• Second’ hypothesis: Routine events are those described to good approximation by quantum
mechanics as formulated presently. Novel events will require a realist completion of quan-
tum physics. Thus, the PCC will be associated with the completion of QM.
• Third’ hypothesis: Only views of novel events or novel law-bound sets of events are corre-
lates of conscious perceptions.
This addresses the unique self problem.
4.2 Principle of precedence: details [28]
Let me now describe the principle of precedence, after which I will give a second example
of a completion of quantum mechanics where a distinction between routine and novel
events or states could arise.
The Principle of Precedent is an idea about the origin of laws, or rather how the notion
of dynamical law could be replaced by a simpler hypothesis.
One context in which it has an especially clear presentation is an operational formu-
lation of quantum mechanics. In such a formulation, each quantum process is broken up
into three stages: i) a preparation, by which the experimenter picks out an initial state,
14we say near-precedents because complete precedents are we hope ruled out in respect for the PII
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ρinitial initial time, tin; ii) a unitary evolution generated over an elapsed time T by a Her-
mitian hamiltonian, U(T ), and iii) a measurement made at tf = tin + T . Given a set of
possible output states, the result is a set of numbers, p(output, input) = TrρfinalUρinitial.
The probabilities p(output, input) for the different possible outcomes depend only on
the elapsed time, T , and not on the initial time, tin, so that the probabilities measured in
the next year will converge with those measured over the last N years. Given this we
could posit a precedence law:
Law of precedence: Given a preparation for a physical system, chose the output state by
picking it randomly from the set of past precedents.
The routine states are those that have a large number of precedence. The novel states
are those without precedents.
How does the universe choose the outcomes of preparations which have no or few
precedents?
This question might require a completion of quantum mechanics to answer. The causal
theory of views and the real ensemble theories are candidates.
But so far as the question of consciousness is concerned we have here a striking sug-
gestion:
The novel states are the physical correlates of conscious events!
That is, experience is made up of those moments where the universe is not guided
by the law of precedents. At these moments, the universe has perhaps some degree of
freedom to choose what happens next. It is these moments of freedom which make up
conscious experience.
Those unprecedented moments are presumably common near the universe’s origin,
and spread throughout the universe. As the universe ages, it takes a higher degree
of complexity for a state to be unprecedented. But we can wonder whether complex
biomolecules might serve as a reservoir of novel states. Might the biosphere and the
brain have evolved, to make use of the special properties of novel states, including the
freedom present at those moments to choose a small part of the future. It is not difficult
to see that this access to novel states might be a selective advantage.
Note that large molecules are made up of smaller subsystem, such as atoms. The com-
ponent atoms will not be novel. What I want to suggest is that if there are entangled or
coherent states which are made of many atoms which are sufficiently large and complex
to be without precedent, these may serve as novel states.
The freedom in choosing the unitary evolution operator acting on such states will not
impinge on the microscopic local dynamics governing each routine component, it will
have to act non-locally, on the whole molecule, and be sufficiently weak so as to not have
been discovered. Such a term might, for example, favour one folding of a protein over
others.
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4.3 The principle of precedence applied to an energetic causal set the-
ory
Ideally we would like to derive relativistic quantum mechanics from the causal theory of
views, along the lines of the derivation of non-relativistic QM we give in [27]. But in the
absence of such a derivation we can anticipate the outcome. This is a quantum theory
built on a causal set, somewhat analogous to a discrete version of a quantum field theory
built over a fixed classical spacetime.
This is an example of a class of theories invented by Fotini Markopoulou called Quan-
tum causal histories[71, 72] They are defined as follows.
• Generate a causal set. There is then a map which assIgns to the causal link connect-
ing event K with an event I in its immediate future, a Hilbert spaceHKI .
Associated with the sky of I is a joint HIlbert space constructed by direct product.
HI = ⊗K<IHKI (6)
• Associated with the same event I there also is the anti-view, which consists of all the
information sent out by I . In classical general relativity the anti-view of an event I
is a cross section through the future light cone of I . If L > I is in the immediate
future of I then
H¯I = ⊗I<LHIL (7)
• Let us assume that the view and anti-view have the same dimension. The quantum
dynamics is constructed to give a unitary evolution from the quantum view to the
quantum pre-view.
UI : HI → H¯I (8)
• To construct the quantum casual histories associated to an energetic causal set (which
we may call an energetic quantum causal history (EQCH)), replace the energy-
mometum vector pKI associated to the link from K to I by the free-particle Hilbert
space
pKI → HKI ∈ ψ(pKI ) (9)
subject to the usual mass shell constraint and norm.
C(p) = 0→ C(p)ψ(p) = 0 (10)
Now we can apply the principle of precedence, as follows.
• Now let us choose a basis for the space of views, HI given by |a >. These are the
preparations. A dual basis for the anti-views is given by < w|. Then as usual
T (I,< w|, |a >) =< w|UI |b > (11)
is the probability that the sky preparation |a > evolves by the event I and yields,
the output state < w|. (in a fixed basis).
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• Now, let D(I, J) be the distant operators on the past causal sets of events I and J .
• Let us consider for an event I , and preparation, |a >, the set of causally past events
J which share the same preparation, |a >, and which are close in the space of views.
We will define P(I, |a >) be the past set of event I consisting of events J << I ,
such that,
D(I, J) <  (12)
We call the members of this set the precedents of (I, |a >). Let there be N(I, |a >)
elements in the set of precedents and let this number be very large. Each event in
this set has an output which is one of the< w|. This gives us an ensemble of outputs,
called O(P(I, |a >)).
Then we apply the principle of precedence, which says that to find the output of I
pick a random element of the ensemble of outputs.
This will agree with the quantum prediction given by (11).
• The interesting question is what to do if the event generator builds an event, N that
has no precedent; the set O(P(I, |a >)) is empty.
In the case of no precedent, the universe must make a choice of output that is not de-
termined by past data; in a certain minimal sense of the word freedom, the universe
makes a free choice.
• I now propose that, The correlates of conscious perceptions are the smallest views which
are unprecedented.
4.4 Energy and qualia
To go further we would like to address the structural problem, we mentioned above and
put the most basic properties of views in correspondence with aspects of conscious per-
ceptions. In the case of visual perception a rather obvious structural similarity suggests
itself. A view consisist of a framing two-sphere, corrresponding to incident direction,
on which are punctures or fields, labelled by incident energy. The experience of visual
perception is a portion of a two-sphere, on which are colours.
This suggests an identification between a range of energies and perceived colours. A
similar argument could be made for the perception of tones.
• Fifth hypothesis: Different qualia of the same modality (ie colours, tones) correspond to
differences in energy.
5 Conclusions
I close with a brief summary of the main assumptions and hypotheses.
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• We propose a new ontology according to which the universe consists of a dynami-
cally evolving collection of partial views of itself.
• The view of an event contains information about its recent causal past neighbour-
hood. The view also represents flows of energy, momentum and other conserved
quantities. The views are the only beables of this theory.
• The dynamics which creates the events and guides the flow of energy on the causal
links depends only on differences amongst views, and expresses a principle of max-
imizing the diversity, or variety of views[51]. There is no fixed background space or
spacetime.
• The replacement of locality (in a background space) with similarity (in a space of
views) has striking consequences. Since space is emergent, so is locality, and the
mechanism by which that happens is that much of the time the world is arranged
so that locality in the emergent space tracks similarity of views. (Come here and
look at what I see!) But locality, being emergent, will have defects, where two very
similar views represent two events which are very far from each other in the emer-
gent spacetime geometry[63]. In [62, 50, 27] I show that this leads to the recovery
of quantum mechanics. The key point is that a small composite system, like an
atom or a small molecule, will have copies which are scattered across the universe.
These nonetheless interact strongly with each other. When there are many copies,
the evolution develops sufficient coherence and the result is unitary Schroedinger
dynamics.
But what of the subsystems that have no copies? How does it evolve? This is ad-
dressed in detail by the real ensemble theory[49], showing that it is indeed a good
candidate for a completion of quantum mechanics.
This suggests a new picture of evolution in quantum physics, which I called the
principle of precedence[28]. A quantum state evolves because the underlying dy-
namics being local in the space of views, it is coupled to the members of an ensem-
ble of similar states in its causal past. These are its precedents, and the proposal is
that quantum dynamics is simply the copying of random precedents from a state’s
causal past.
A state without precedents can be called a novel state-one that has not so far existed
in the history of the universe. A key question to be addressed by a completion of
quantum theory is then, how is an unprecedented state to chose what next to do?
Within this framework for a relational physics, we make five hypotheses about the
physical correlates of consciousness.
1. First hypothesis: Each framed conscious perception corresponds to the view of a physical
event or law-bound sets of events.
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2. Second hypothesis: Common events, which are those whose views have many near copies,
are those described to good approximation by quantum mechanics as formulated presently.
These are not correlates of conscious perceptions.
3. Third hypothesis: Only views of unique events or unique law-bound sets of events are cor-
relates of conscious perceptions.
4. Fourth hypothesis: Only the top level of each hierarchy of ensembles of views are correlates
of conscious perceptions. These are the first levels in the hierarchy which are unique single
views, with no near copies.
5. Fifth hypothesis: Different qualia of the same modality (ie colours, tones) correspond to
differences in energy.
Thus, while standard panpsychism proposes that there are qualia (or proto-qualia)
associated with all physical states or processes, this new view proposes that there are
framed or bundled conscious perceptions, associated to a very restricted subset of views-
those that are novel, and maximal in the sense described.
These first four hypotheses explain together the self problem, the presentist self prob-
lem and the unique self problem.
How do we proceed from here?
Of course, the most urgent question is to make contact with neurobiology. To do that
we need a suggestion as to actual physical processes acting in specific neural tissues that
have the needed characteristics. Principally, they have to be novel in the sense of having
no or few precedents or copies. One way to build such unprecedented states would be
to entangle a large enough number of qubits that simple combinatorial complexity could
guarantee uniqueness. But this seems like pure fantasy, where in the brain’s warm en-
vironment are we to find large sets of entangled qubits? Under present evidence, there
would seem to be little chance the brain constructs protected channels, topological or
otherwise?
One way to look for coherently entangled qubits in the brain is to make use of the
suggestion of Mathew Fisher that sets of the nuclear spins of phosphorus shielded in
phosphate and randomized to project out protected noise free channels might provide a
source of qubits in biological systems[77]. One place they are found is in the bilayers of
phospholipid molecules, which form the membrane of the neuron. Each such molecule
has a “head”, which is composed of a phosphate group, possibly linked to other groups.
Two chains or tails extend downward, each composed of carbon-hydrogen units. The
prospects for there being significant quantum effects involving these spins will be dis-
cussed separately[78].
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